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This paper studies how buyers’ integration a¤ects the capacity choice
of a producer. Contrary to «conventional wisdom», we show that, un-
der natural assumptions, integration may lead to a higher equilibrium
supply level. Our result hinges on the following trade-o¤: for any given
level of capacity, the share of the total surplus accruing to the producer
is lower when concentration is high, i.e. the hold-up is more severe.
Yet, this share decreases when capacity increases. This reduces the
incentives to increase capacity. The rate at which this occurs is higher
when concentration is low. The second e¤ect counteracts, and may
dominate, the …rst. When the cost of capacity is low the equilibrium
supply level is always higher when downstream concentration is high.
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1”... as one might expect, if two competing traders merge, this will worsen
the (investment) incentives of the owner-manager of a …rm that trades with
them.”1
1 Introduction
A hold-up may arise when parties have to make investments which create
more value inside a relationship than outside. Facing the impossibility to
writecomplete contingent contracts, each party anticipates that some of the
bene…ts from its investment will be dissipated in future bargaining. The
fear of expropriation leads to ine¢cient investment.
Bargaining power, and consequently investment incentives, are deter-
mined by the asset ownership structure. Distinct asset ownerships thus cre-
atedistinct investment incentives. Theseprinciples, introducedinGrossman–
Hart (1986), Hart–Moore (1990) and Hart (1995), have been successfully
applied to a large number of speci…c economic environments.
In this paper, we use these principles to study the following question:
How does the integration of buyers of a good a¤ect the capacity choice of the
monopolist who supplies it?
For ease of exposition we study this question in a particular setting,
where a monopolist producer sells his output to a retail or manufacturing
sector with varying degrees of concentration2.
Conventional wisdom seems to suggest that equilibrium production ca-
pacity will be higher when downstream concentration is low. It seems intu-
itive that, when concentration is high, the producer will be more exposed
to expropriation, i.e. the ”hold-up” is more signi…cant.
Downstream concentration/integration may thus raise concerns of long
terme¢ciency. In recent years, thisconcernhasbeen put forwardby compe-
tition authorities. Examples include the retail sector (Rewe/Meinl, Opera,
Kesko/Tuko)3, the…lm and cableindustry (Syufy, CableAct 92)4 and, more
1Hart–Moore (1990) p. 1148.
2We could have alternatively considered a producer who sells to …nal consumers or a
…rm purchasing labour-complementary capital. In the former case, integration would be
interpreted as the formation of consumer cooperatives. In the latter, as union formation.
3Rewe/Meinl (EC Case No. M.1221), Opera (Conseil de la Concurrence Decision No.
3-D-11), Kesko/Tuko (EC Case No. M.784)
4US vs. Syufy, Cable Act 92 see Congress of the United States (1992).
2generally, in the European Commission’s guidelines on purchasing agree-
ments5.
Surprisingly, the economics literature contains little formal analysis of
the e¤ect ofdownstream horizontal integration on producers’ investment in-
centives. Webrie‡y summarize two strands of theproperty rights literature
that can help us in answering our question.
A …rst topicof the literatureisthat asset ownershipstructuresthat leave
aparty ina betterbargaining position (measured by it’sshareofthebargain-
ing surplus), by protecting him against expropriation, boost his investment
incentives. The equilibrium investment level of this party will therefore in-
crease (e.g. Grossman–Hart (1986), Hart–Moore (1990) and Chiu (1998)).
Hart–Moore (1990) studies similar issues to the one we address here.
Based on theirresults, the authors argue that ”...as one might expect, if two
competing traders merge, this will worsen the (investment) incentives of the
owner-manager of a …rm that trades with them”.
This …rst topic seems to support what we named conventional wisdom.
In fact, for any given capacity level, we expect a negative relation between
the share of surplus accruing to the producer and retail concentration (see
Segal (2003) and references therein). We may thus expect retail integration
to decrease the producer’s investment incentives. However, this is only part
of the story.
A second topicofthisliteratureconcernsthechoiceoftypes of investment
rather than thelevel of investment. A well known idea is that sometypes of
technologies leave the producer in a stronger bargaining position, since they
make other parties less indispensable to value creation (e.g. Holmstrom–
Tirole (1991) and Segal–Whinston (2000)). This creates a strategic bias in
technology choice.
A few papers study this technological bias in settings related to ours.
Stole–Zwiebel (1996a,b) …nd that unionization and technology choices are
related to one another. A …rm dealing with a union has higher incentives
to choose frontloaded technologies (i.e. technologies which generate a high
proportion of the gains at high production levels) than a …rm dealing with
independent workers.
Any single worker is indispensable only to produce the last units of out-
put. A more frontloaded technology leaves each single worker more indis-
pensable since it’s marginal contribution to the total surplus will be higher.
5Guidelines on the applicability of the Article 81 (2001). Purchasing agreements are
expected to produce a similar e¤ect since downstream …rms coordinate their purchasing
decisions.
3When bargaining with independent workers, by choosing a less front-
loaded technology the producer leverages its bargaining position since this
makes each single worker more dispensable. When dealing with a union this
strategicincentive is absent: a union is, by de…nition, always indispensable.
Unionization may thus promote technological e¢ciency.
Retail integration has a similar e¤ect on the technology choice of an up-
stream …rm. A more concentrated retail sector provides incentives for an
upstream …rm to chooselessfrontloaded technologies (Inderst–Wey (2002)).
The authors show, with some applications, that retail concentration may in-
crease thesupplier’s incentives for product and process innovation. Inderst–
Wey (2003) shows how some of these results extend to a bilateral duopoly
framework.
This leaves an open question: if the extent to which downstream …rms
are indispensable to the industry is a¤ected by the capacity level6, our con-
ventional wisdom may be missing an important element of the problem.
In this paper we show that, under ”natural assumptions” on market
revenue functions, each downstream …rm becomes more indispensable as
capacity increases.
Increasing capacity raises thetotal bargaining surplus but, because each
…rm becomes more indispensable, it will also erodethe share of thebargain-
ing surplus accruing to the producer (the measure of bargaining power). It
thus aggravates the”hold-up”. Thiscapturesthefact that bargaining power
results not only of the control over a resource, but also from its relative
scarcity. This ”bargaining erosion” creates an additional strategic concern.
Moreover, at least at high capacity levels, the rate at which this ”bar-
gaining erosion” occurs is lower when retail concentration is high. Strategic
concerns to choose a low capacity are therefore weak when retail concentra-
tion is high.
Concentration has thus two e¤ects on producer’s incentives: it increases
the ”hold-up” e¤ect but it softens the ”bargaining erosion” e¤ect.
This paper studies the relative importance of these two e¤ects. Our
main result is that, the second e¤ect may dominate the …rst i.e. a higher
downstream concentration does not unambiguously decrease the producer’s
marginal returns to capacity. Equilibrium capacity level may well increase
with retail concentration.
In our model, this will always bethecaseif the marginal cost ofcapacity
is low. Only when the marginal cost of installing capacity is high will the
“hold-up” e¤ect dominate and the ”conventional wisdom” go through.
6This possibility is ruled out by assumption in Hart–Moore (1990).
4At a practical level, these results should be useful to merger analyses.
This work shows that signing the e¤ect of retail concentration on the pro-
ducers’ investment incentives is not as straightforward as it may seem and
provides some intuition to which types of investment one should be most
concerned with.
At a more theoretical level, these results provide some theoretical sup-
port to Galbraith’s (1952) theory of Countervailing Power. One of its main
ideas is that, when competition fails on both sides of the market, allocative
e¢ciency may be nurtured not by increased competition but by a process of
concentration on the most competitive side. Consumers may bene…t from
retail concentration since prices should fall when output is increased.
Since the speci…c allocation of the bargaining surplus depends on the
chosen solution concept, this choice is a crucial step. We chose to use the
Shapley value. Sinceit hasbothaxiomaticandnon-cooperativefoundations,
theShapley valuehas provided a useful benchmark for theliterature7. Other
solution concepts produce similar results8.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates
the main ideas of this paper with a simple example. The model is presented
in section 3 and the analysis carried out in section 4. Section 5 takes a
preliminary look at other solution concepts, and veri…es that the results do
not hinge on speci…cities of the Shapley value. In section 6, we discuss the
results and their implications. Proofs are found in the appendix.
2 A simple example
Suppose a producer can, at date 0, chose capacity Q to produce either one
or two units of some tradable good. The cost of a unit of capacity is 2.5,
marginal costs ofproduction are zero. Thereare two markets with a retailer
in each market, i and j. Date 1 demand is such that, in each market one
unit can be sold for 6 but there is no demand for a second unit.
Suppose in addition that no long-term contracts can be signed at date
0. The producer’s pro…ts are thus date 1 gains minus date 0 costs. The
discount rate is assumed to be zero. Date 1 gains from trade will be split
7Papers dealing with the e¤ects of integration have often used this solution concept (e.g.
Hart–Moore (1990), Stole–Zwiebel (1996a), Inderst–Wey (2003)and Segal (2003)). Nonco-
operative games that implement the Shapley value can be found e.g. in Gul (1989), Stole–
Zwiebel (1996) and Hart–Mas-Colell (1996). For the axiomatization see e.g. Osborne–
Rubinstein (1994).
8See section 5 below.
5according to each agent’s date 1 Shapley value Shp(Q). So the producer




To build theintuition driving theresult, wewritetheproducer’sShapley
value as a share ®(Q) of the industry surplus V(Q), i.e. Shp = ®¢ V.
Suppose the producer has chosen a capacity of one unit at date 0. Then
his date 1 revenue is Shp(1) = 2
3 ¢ 6. Suppose instead the producer has
chosen a capacity of two units. Then, when bargaining with retailer i, the
threat of excluding him and sell all capacity to retailer j has no value: j has
no use for a second unit. This weakens the producer’s bargaining position,
so the share of the ex-post surplus accruing to the producer decreases. His
date 1 revenue is Shp(2) = 1
















Althougha capacity oftwo unitswouldbee¢cient, ex-ante the producer
chooses a capacity ofoneunit sincetherevenue di¤erential islower than the
cost (2 <2:5).
Imagine now that the two retailers merge, forming a retail monopoly.
How would the producer’s capacity choice change?
Had the producer chosen a capacity of one unit his revenue would be
Sh0
p(1) = 1
2 ¢ 6. If he chose a capacity of two units his revenue would be
Sh0
p(2) = 1
2 ¢12. Since both the producer and the retailer are essential, each
of them always gets half the gains from trade. In this situation, his pro…t
maximizing capacity choice is 2 units, since therevenuedi¤erential is higher







(12 ¡6) = 3 >2:5
In this particular example, retailer integration thus leads to a higher
equilibrium capacity. The example is extreme since retail outlets and the
tradable good exhibit perfect complementarity. However it captures the
essence of the problem.
The share of date 1 surplus accruing to the producer is (weakly) higher
before integration, i.e. the ”hold-up” is weaker. If the producer’s share
of the surplus were to remain constant while capacity increases, producer’s
incentives would be unambiguously higher when facing two independent
retailers.
6What counteracts this e¤ect is that the capacity choice also determines
the strength of the producer’s threat to exclude a retailer, and thus the
producer’s bargaining position.
Before integration, the share of surplus decreases as capacity increases
(2
3 with 1 unit, 1
2 with 2), thus increasing capacity aggravates the ”hold-up”.
This creates a strategic incentive to keep capacity low in order to avoid a
signi…cant bargaining power erosion. We call this the ”bargaining erosion”
e¤ect.
















¢ 6 =1 >0
The left hand side captures the increase in the ”hold-up” due to integra-
tion. The right hand side of the expression the softening of the ”bargaining
erosion”. The e¤ect of concentration on the equilibrium capacity is deter-
mined by the interaction of these two e¤ects. In this particular example,
the second e¤ect dominates the …rst one. Below, we establish these results
in a much more general setting.
3 The Model
3.1 Setup
We consider a vertical industry comprising n retailers (or manufacturing
…rms) and one producer. Denote the set of agents by A = f0; 1; ::;ng where
agent 0 is the producer. There are k ¸ n identical ”island markets” with
one outlet in each market. Denote the set of all outlets by K =f1;2; ::;kg.
Each identical outlet generates a net revenue (gains from trade) ofR(q),
where q is the quantity allocated to that particular outlet. In the spirit of
Hart–Moore(1990), this net revenuefunctionmay account forthepossibility
of retailers having access to an alternative, less valuable, competitivesupply
source and for any additional cost of transforming the intermediate good
into a …nal good.
We assume that R(0) = 0; is twice di¤erentiable with R0(q) > 0 and
R
00(q) < 0 for 0 < q <q; and9 R(q) = R(q) for q ¸ q.
Note that each single market revenue is independent of the quantities
allocated to theother markets. This might be tough of as having consumers
9A critical assumption is that the revenue function is upper bounded. If this condition
fails, we can no longer guarantee that all the results will hold.
7purchasing the …nal product only in their ”island market”, i.e. retailers
competing on the intermediate market but not on the …nal market.
Althoughthismodelling choiceismotivatedby technical considerations10,
it allows us to concentrate on vertical strategic interaction while capturing
interesting cases. Forinstance, situationswheremarketsarenon-overlapping
(due to product di¤erentiation, geography, etc..) or when consumers switch
brands within stores rather than stores within brands.
The trimming of the game is the following: at date 0, the producer
chooses a capacity level Q 2 R+; which allows him to produce a divisible
homogeneous good and pays the installation costs. The cost of installing
capacity is described by an increasing convex function F(Q) = F0 +f(Q)
with f0(Q) ¸0.
At date 1, the producer can produce up to Q at some constant non-
negative marginal cost11. The allocation of his production among the re-
tailers, as well as the distribution of gains, is determined in a multiparty
bargaining game that takes place at date 1. Denote the producer’s payo¤ of
the date 1 bargaining game by S0(Q).
We are interested in a non-cooperative situation in which the producer
chooses the industry capacity level at date 0, anticipating that bargaining
will take place at date 1.
We thus take an ”incomplete contract” approach by assuming that the
terms of trade cannot be speci…ed in advance, i.e. before capacity is cho-
sen. This assumption is intended to capture the di¢culties of contractually
specifying all aspects of performance and the inability to commit not to
renegotiate12. Casual empiricism suggests that this is consistent with com-
mon practice: supply contracts in general have a shorter life than capacity
investments.
10See subsection 3.3 and also section 6 below.
11A constant marginal costs is considered to be already accounted for in the net revenue
function R(qi) since this function merely represents the gains from trade. Allowing for
increasing or decreasing marginal costs would introduce additional technical complications
since R(qi) would also depend on the quantities traded in the other markets.
12We are sensitive to the fact that this assumption, while common in the literature,
has been questioned on the grounds that in some sense it re‡ects imperfections that
should perhaps be made explicit rather than assumed. Che–Hausch (1999) shows, in a
bilateral setting, that when the producer’s investment improves the buyer’s valuation of
the good (here increasing quantity increases the revenue the retailer can generate), if
parties can’t commit not to renegotiate, contracting doesn’t perform any better than ex
post negotiation.
8The producer’s objective is thus:
Max
Q2R+ S0(Q) ¡F(Q)
The objective of our analysis is to study how downstream concentra-
tion/integration a¤ects the producer’s capacity choice.
3.2 Ownership structures
To study the e¤ects of horizontal concentration we need to consider retail
structures with varying degrees of concentration. The …rst step is to specify
what a retail ownership structure is. Denote by P(K) the set of all subsets
of K, and P(A) the set of all subsets of A with a typical element A. To a
retail ownership structure Z corresponds a mapping z from P(A) to P(K)
where z(A) is the subset of outlets controlled by A. We assume …rst that
only retailers own outlets. Hence:
z(0) =; (1)
Second, weassume that each retailer holdsexclusiveproperty rights over
some subset of outlets. Therefore, for any partition A[(AnA) ofA, each of
the outlets is owned by at most one of the subsets:
z(A) \z(AnA) = ; (2)
Note that it is possible for some retailers to own no outlets. Finally, the
outlets owned by any subset A0 of A must be also owned by A, i.e.:
z(A0) µz(A) 8A0 µA (3)
De…nition 1: To aretail ownership structure Z corresponds a map-
ping z from P(A) to P(K) satisfying (1),(2) and (3).
There is a family of mappings satisfying these conditions13. In order to
compare retail ownership structures with varying degrees of concentration
weusetheconcept ofintegration. Integration givessomeretaileri thecontrol
of all outlets owned by retailer j in the former retail ownership structure14.
13More precisely, there exist n
k distinct retail ownership structures.
14The reason to focus on integration rather than on partial transfers of assets is that by
doing so we insure that asset transfer leads to a higher concentration.
9De…nition 2: A retail ownership structure Z0 is an integrated struc-
ture of the retail ownership structure Z if 9i;j 2 A; with z(i) 6= ; and









is an integrated structure of Z0 and Z0 is an integrated structure
of Z then Z00 is also more concentrated than Z: We can therefore establish
chains on theset ofownership structures which aremonotonic in concentra-
tion.
3.3 Solution concept
Using the ”island market” model for the retail sector has two advantages.
First, it allows us to concentrate on vertical strategic interaction. Second,
it allow us to use the Shapley value as the solution concept to the date
1 bargaining game. The Shapley value describes the second stage revenue
accruing to each agent. It is used on the assumption that the bargaining
outcomeise¢cient. Ifonewereto allow fordownstreammarket competition
this assumption would be more di¢cult to make.
We do not proposea particular extensive-form bargaining gamethat im-
plements the Shapley value, this has been the object of previous research15.
Stole-Zwiebel (1996a), forexample, describea gamebetween a central player
(…rm/producer) and n pherepherical players (workers/retailers) that imple-
ments the Shapley value. The bargaining between the …rm and any worker
follows an alternating-o¤er bargaining game as in Binmore–Rubinstein–
Wolinski (1986) with a probability of breakdown. Following breakdown,
negotiations resume between the …rm and the remaining workers. The equi-
librium of this game is shown to be the Shapley value.
Inorderto introducetheShapley value, weneed to specify thegainsfrom
tradethat thevariouspartitionsofagentsA[(AnA) ofA canachieveontheir
own. In the second stage ofthe game, for a given retail ownership structure
Z, if an agreement between a subset of agents A is reached, they form a
coalition A which controls jz(A)j outlets, where jz(A)j denotes the number
of elements of z(A). If 0 2 A, the coalition also controls the production
capacity Q.
15See also footnote 7.
10Since R(q) is concave, the value coalition A can generateby choosing an







jz(A)j) if 0 2 A
0 otherwise
V(:) is the characteristic value function of the underlying date 1 game.
Changing the outlet ownership structure will in‡uence the game outcome
because it changes the characteristic value function.
Note that, if the producer belongs to coalition A, V(:) is increasing and
concave in the number of outlets controlled by coalition A.






¢ (V(Q; A;Z) ¡V(Q;Ani; Z))





!A ¢ V(Q; A; Z)
The producer’s program is thus:
Max
Q2R+ Sh0(Q; Z)¡F(Q)
Since V(Q;A;Z) is concavein Qand F(Q) isassumed to be convex, the
producer’s problem can be solved by …rst order conditions. What we are
interested in isstudying how the producer’s optimal capacity choicechanges
with integration.
A …rst remark is in order here. For all ownership structures, underin-











@QSh0(Q; Z) > 0 8Q< kq
= @
@QSh0(Q; Z) = 0 8Q¸ kq
The producer underinvests in capacity because he anticipates that some
of the bene…ts from his investment are dissipated in future bargaining. It
follows that a ownership structure that yields a higher equilibrium capacity
is also a more e¢cient one.
3.4 Di¤erence Operators
We now introduce di¤erence operators, previously used by Segal (2003),
which will be used throughout the analysis. De…ne the…rst-order di¤erence
operator as:
4iV(A) =V(A)¡V(Ani)
The di¤erence operator 4i(A) measures the marginal contribution of
agent i to a coalition A, for all A µ A. As it is de…ned, it doesn’t depend
on whether coalition A includes agent i. Although we de…ned the di¤erence
operator with respect to a single agent i, it can be applied to subsets of
agents A0 ½ A:
De…nition 3: Player h is indispensable if ¢A0V(A) = 0 for all A and
A0 ½ A whenever h = 2 A.
The producer is always indispensable. Some retailer i is indispensable if
and only if i is a retail monopolist.
De…ne also the second-order di¤erence operator as:
¢2
ijV(A) =¢i(¢jV(A))
It expresses player i0s e¤ect on player j0s marginal contribution to a
coalition A. It describes the complementarity/substitution of two agents in
coalition A. The exact expression is developed below for clarity:
¢ijV(A) =V(A [ i [ j) ¡V(Ani [ j) ¡V(Anj [ i) +V(Aninj)
To alleviate notation in the remainder of the paper, when talking of a
coalition A we always refer to coalitions containing the producer. In the
remaining cases, the characteristic value of A is trivially equal to 0.





< 0 if Q 2 (0; jz(A [ i [ j)jq)
=0 if Q¸ jz(A [ i [ j)jq
Retailers are substitutes, so retailer i0s e¤ect on retailer j0s marginal
contribution to a coalition A is negative, i.e. ¢ijV(A) < 0. Only when
capacity is high, so that retailer i has no use for those units of output sold
by retailer j; does retailer i0s e¤ect on retailer j0s marginal contribution
become negligible.
4 Analysis
Thequestionweareinterestedin ishow theproducer’smarginal return to in-
vestment varies with the degreeof retail concentration. Since thebargaining
outcomeise¢cient, wecan writetheproducer’s date1 revenue Sh0(Q; Z) as
the share ®(Q; Z) of the industry surplus V(Q;A), which does not depend











How do marginal returns to investment change from a retail ownership
structure Z to an integrated ownership structure Z0?
@






















In the next subsection we show that with integration theshare ofex-post
surplus accruing to the producer decreases, i.e. integration aggravates the
”hold-up”. Therefore, the …rst element of (4) is negative.
In subsection 4.2, we look at how the producer’s bargaining position,
as measured by his equilibrium share of surplus, is a¤ected by the level of
13investment. We show that, the producer’s share decreases as capacity in-
creases, i.e. increasing capacity aggravatesthe hold-up (bargaining erosion).
In subsection 4.3 we show that, at least for high capacity levels, the
magnitude of the ”bargaining erosion” decreases with integration, i.e. inte-
gration softens the ”bargaining erosion” e¤ect. In such a case the second
element of (4) is positive. The two e¤ects counteract one another.
Finally, in subsection 4.4 we look at the net e¤ect of integration on
investment incentives and on the equilibrium investment level.
4.1 Integration and the ”hold-up” e¤ect
Here we study the relation between retail concentration and the share of
surplus accruing to the producer. Intuition tells us that when retail con-
centration increases, the scope the producer has for playing one retailer o¤
against another will be reduced. We would therefore expect the producer’s
share to decrease with integration. This intuition is veri…ed in our model.
Lemma 1 (Segal 2003): For an indispensable producer, if Z0 is a




fi= 2A and j2Ag
!A ¢ ¢2
ijV(A;Z)
We can now establish this subsection’s main result:
Proposition 1 Integration aggravates the hold-up: If Z0 is an inte-





and ®(Q;Z0) = ®(Q; Z) for Q¸ k
_
q.
Integration increases retailers’ ability to ”hold-up” the producer because
it eliminates competition among retailers. Thus it reduces the share of the
bargaining surplus the producer can expect to obtain.
However, if in the second stage of the game the industry is not capacity
constrained, i.e. if Q ¸ k
_
q, retailers have no need to compete with each
other for the good and thereforedownstream market structure has no e¤ect
on the producer’s revenue.
This last point, although not totally new17, is interesting on its own.
Consider for examplethevisual entertainment industry. Movietheaters and
17See below.
14cable operators are often local monopolists. The production technology is
characterized by some…xed cost andsomelow constant …xedcost, i.e. oncea
…lm/series is produced, copies can be made at low cost and di¤used on each
market. For this reason, the movie theater/cable industry market structure
should, a-priori, have no e¤ect on the supply of visual entertainment.
This is a an extreme result and provides only a benchmark. Adding
elements to the model could turn this result in either way. The relative
importance of these elements should be taken into account.
Forexample, if…rmsarerisk averse (Chae-Heidhues (1999)) downstream
integration will reduce supply. Also, if producers can earn direct advertis-
ing rents (Chipty-Snyder (1999)), or if marginal costs of production are
non-linear (Inderst–Wey (2002)) the producer’s bargaining position can be
a¤ected by downstream integration.
4.2 The ”bargaining erosion” e¤ect
We now turn to the question, of how the level of capacity a¤ects the pro-
ducer’s bargaining position, as measured by his equilibrium share ofsurplus.
We …nd that increasing capacity aggravates the ”hold-up”.
The intuition is as follows. When production capacity is low, if the
producer and one of the retailer fail to reach an agreement, then, as long as
theproducerreaches anagreement with theremaining retailers, theindustry
revenue will not fall by a lot. The full industry surplus could be almost
achieved by the producer and theremaining retailers. In such a situation, it
iseasy fortheproducertoplay o¤oneretaileragainst anotherby threatening
to sell all his output through the rivals’ outlets.
As capacity increases, each retailer’s contribution becomes more funda-
mental to achievethe maximum industry revenue. Each retailerknowsthat,
if the producer were to carry out the threat to sell all his output through
the rivals’ outlets, this would severely decrease the industry surplus and
consequently its own pro…ts.
When capacity is high, the producer’s threat to exclude any one retailer
is less credible. The choice of a high capacity has, from the producer’s
perspective, the undesirable e¤ect of eroding his bargaining position. Only
in the case of a retail monopoly, will ® be constant (and equal to one half),
since both the producer and the retailer are always essential.
Also, if the industry is not capacity constrained in the second stage of
the game, the share will be constant (and equal to one half) since retailers
do not need to compete with each other and therefore the threat described
above disappears.
15Proposition 2 ”Bargaining erosion” e¤ect: for any given ownership
structure Z (except a retail monopolist) we have that @
@Q®(Q; Z) < 0:
² a) for all ”su¢ciently high” Q (<kq).
² b) for all Q 2 (0;kq) if the market revenue elasticity ²R(q) is strictly





In the case of aretail monopolist, andfor all Z when Q¸ kq; @
@Q®(Q; Z) =
0:
A decreasing market revenue elasticity ²R(q) is tantamount to say that
the percent increase in revenue that can be achieved with a one percent
increase of input decreases as output increases. This sounds like something
reasonable18, soweshouldin general expect theshareofthesurplus accruing
to the producer to decrease as capacity increases.
This ”bargaining erosion2 e¤ect creates an additional strategic concern.
When making his capacity choice, the producer will take into account the
fact that increasing capacity erodes his bargaining position.
4.3 Integration and the ”bargaining erosion” e¤ect
We now turn to thequestion ofhow the magnitude of the ”bargaining erosion
e¤ect” changes with integration.
The bargaining erosion e¤ect arises because increasing capacity makes
eachretailermoreessential to achievetheindustry surplus. Sinceintegration
makes each retailer more essential to start o¤ with, we may expect this
strategic e¤ect to be weaker.
In fact, wecan show that at least at high capacity levels, the magnitude
of the ”bargaining erosion” e¤ect decreases with integration, i.e.:
Proposition 3 Integration softens ”bargaining erosion” There exists
some critical value b Q such that the rate at which the share of the surplus
18For example, withlinearpricing and zero marginal costs this is veri…ed for both convex
and linear demand functions. There exists as well a subset of convex consumer demand
functions that verify this condition. This subset contains many commonly used demand
functions, such as the log and inverse. An interesting exception is the constant elasticity
of demand: ²R(q) is constant. However, it’s revenue is not upper bounded. Adding a
positive marginal cost not only makes the revenue function upper bounded but it also
guarantees that ²R(q) is strictly decreasing.



















¯ for Q2 (b Q;kq)
The …gure below illustrates this proposition. The rate at which ®(Q;Z)
decreases as capacity increases is higher than the rate at which ®(Q; Z0)
decreases. The dotted line represents an alternative path for ®(Q;Z). The
rate at which it decreases is low for low values of Q, but it becomes steeper
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4.4 Integration and capacity choice
To sum up, we have seen that concentration will increase expropriation
(proposition 1). So the left hand side of (4) is, as expected, negative.
However, concentrationcanalso reducetheproducer’sincentivetostrate-
gically choose a low capacity level (proposition 3). So the right hand side of
(4) will be positive, at least for ”su¢ciently high” capacity levels.
Whether the marginal return to increased capacity raises or falls with
concentration depends on the magnitude of these two e¤ects. This subsec-
tion looks at how the trade o¤ is solved and at how integration a¤ects the
equilibrium capacity choice.
17The …rst result states that marginal returns always cross (perhaps more
than once). So no ownership structure provides unambiguously higher in-
vestment incentives. Moreover, for ”su¢ciently high” Q they are always
higher under integration.
Proposition 4 There exists acritical value e Q(< (k¡maxfjz(i)j ;jz(j)jg)q)
such that @
@QSh0(A; Z0) ¡ @







This proposition not only proves the existence of some critical capacity
level after which marginal returns to capacity are higher in a integrated
structure, but it also provides an upper bound to the critical value. This
bound is strictly lower than the level at which any of the integrating parties
becomes strictly essential19.
The …gure below illustrates this proposition. Marginal returns to capac-











Recall that thecost of installing capacity isgiven by an increasing di¤er-
entiable convex function F(Q). Since Sh(Q; Z) is concave it can be solved,
as discussed above, by …rst order conditions. Solving this problem give us
the following result:
19That is, the level at which, in the absence of either i or j, increasing capacity would
have no value.
18Proposition 5 The equilibrium capacity Q¤ is strictly higher in an inte-
grated structure, i.e. Q¤
Z0 > Q¤
Z if the cost of capacity is low, i.e. if:
² @
@QF( e Q) · @
@QSh0( e Q;Z0)
² argmaxSh0(Q; Z0) ¡F(Q) >0
Equilibrium capacity increases with integration iftwo conditionsare ver-
i…ed. Marginal costs are low and …xed costs are not too high (producer’s
ex-ante pro…ts must be positive). When marginal costs are low, the in-
dustry’s optimal production capacity is high, and the ”bargaining erosion
e¤ect” becomes more important. Integration will then lead to an increase
in equilibrium capacity.
Only when the cost of capacity is su¢ciently high will the”conventional
wisdom” go through, and the ”hold-up e¤ect” dominate.
The tablebelow summarizes thee¤ect of downstream integration on the
equilibrium capacity choice Q¤.
F0 low F0 high
f0(Q) =0 = =
” ” low % &
” ” high & &
5 Other bargaining solutions
For a givengamedi¤erent solution conceptsmay beconsidered. Thissection
o¤ers a preliminary discussion of how the previous results extend to other
bargaining solutions.
Sincewedidn’t makeuseoftheweightsoftheShapley valuein any ofthe
proofs, our results remain valid if we used instead any other random-order
value.
Another solution we may want to look at is the ”split the di¤erence”
rule20. In this case, the producer’s payo¤ is given by:




20The producer and each single retailer bargain over the marginal contribution of the
retailer. The outcome of each single negotiation is obtained using the two person Nash
bargaining solution.
19Where ½ is the fraction each retailer obtains from his marginal contribu-
tion. It is easy to check that:
S0(Z0) ¡S0(Z) =½¢2
ijV(A; Z)
The second order di¤erence operator appears here as well. Using the
”split the di¤erence” rule would therefore give us similar results.
Thesolution conceptsweconsidered up to now all sharea common prop-
erty: pay-o¤s are determined a linear function of themarginal contributions
of the players. We may additionally want to consider non-linear bargaining
solutions.
This is of particular interest because some of the ownership e¤ects iden-
ti…ed in Hart–Moore (1990) using the Shapley value, may be reversed us-
ing non-linearbargaining solutions (seedeMeza–Lockwood (1998) and Chiu
(1998)).
We address this issue in a simple setting with two retailers, two outlets
and the two distinct ownership structures: retail monopoly and ”competi-
tion” (as in the introductory example). We use as a solution concept the
nucleolus.
In this particular setting, the Shapley value and the nucleolus have non-
cooperative foundations that can berelated. Both allocations can beimple-
mented by adaptationsofthealternating o¤ersbargaining gamein a speci…c
multilateral bargaining environment with one producer and two retailers21.
The main di¤erence stems from the fact that, when alternative trades work
as threat points (inside options) we obtain the Shapley value . If alterna-
tivetrades work as constraints on equilibrium payo¤s22 (outside-options) we
obtain the nucleolus.
In the case of ”competition”, if an agreement is reached with a single
retailer, the surplus is V(A¡i) = R(Q), and if agreement is reached with
both retailers the surplus is V(A) = 2R(
Q
2 ). In this setting, the nucleolus,
usually quite cumbersome to work with, takes a very simple form.
Since V(A) ¸ V(A¡i) for all Q, the nucleolus of the producer N0(Q), is
simply the value ofthe surplus that can be achieved if all supply is allocated
to a single retailer, i.e. N0(Q) = R(Q). In the case of a retail monopoly,
we are back to the simple bargaining model, i.e. the producer gets half the




21Horn-Wolinski (1988) present a bargaining game whose subgame-perfect equilibrium
implements the nucleolus for the case where the number of pheripherical players is equal
to 2. For the case of the Shapley value see Stole-Zwiebel (1996a) and subsection 3.3 above.
22To see when one or the other case may apply see p.g. deMezza-Lockwood (1998).
20Forany givenQ; theshareofthesurplusaccruing totheproduceris, once
again, lower in the concentrated retail structure (R(Q) >R(
Q
2 )). However,





2) 8Q 2 (0;2q)). With outside option bargaining, down-
stream integration appears to motivate, rather than discourage, investment.
6 Conclusion
This paper studied how integration of agents who compete for an input
a¤ects the capacity choice of a monopolist supplying that input. We show
that, contrary to conventional wisdom, there is no monotonic relationship
between retail concentration and the producer’s level of investment.
The reason is that the producer’s bargaining position is a¤ected by his
capacity choice. While retail concentration increases the ”hold-up” itself,
it also gives the producer a stronger incentive to focus on increasing the
industry surplus rather than on strategic concerns that can lead to a low
capacity choice. As a result, the producer’s equilibrium capacity level may
be higher when downstream concentration is high.
On a theoretical level these results support Galbraith’s (1952) idea of
Countervailing Power in the sense that the emergence of a concentrated
retail sector may improve allocative e¢ciency and consumer welfare. In our
model it may be the case that as concentration increases, so does capacity ,
and consumerprices fall. Then, consumers bene…t from retail concentration.
Galbraith’s informal argument is that one position of power may be
neutralized by another23. In our model, the mechanism at play is slightly
di¤erent. Bargaining power arises from controlling a scarce resource. The
producer has a strategic incentive to maintain the resource he controls rel-
atively scarce in order to leverage his bargaining power. This e¤ect, which
distorts supply downwards, is particularly important when the retail sector
exhibits a low level of concentration
These results are of interest for other settings. For example, they cast
doubt on the usual claim that unionization reduces a …rm’s incentive to
invest in labour-complementary capital.
Wehaveavoided the issue ofdownstream competition in order to use the
Shapley value as a solution concept. We conjecture that, similar results will
23”The fact that a seller enjoys a measure of monopoly power (..) means that there is
an inducement to those …rms from whom he buys or those to whom he sells to develop
the power with which they can defend themselves against exploitation, (..). In this way
the existence of market power creates an incentive to the organization of another position
of power that neutralizes it.” Galbraith (1952) p. 119.
21hold if retailers compete for the same customers, as long as retailers have
somemarket power. However, to rigorously address this issue wewould have
to work with a di¤erent set-up. This remains an open issue.
Appendix
Proof of Property 1:
Since jz(A [ i [ j)j+jz(Aninj)j =jz(Ani [ j)j+jz(Anj [ i)j there exists
° such that:
°jz(A [ i [j)j +(1 ¡°)jz(Aninj)j = jz(Ani [ j)j
(1 ¡°) jz(A [ i [ j)j +°jz(Aninj)j = jz(Anj [ i)j
Recall that V(:) is increasing and concave in the number of outlets a coali-
tion A controls jz(A)j. More precisely, V(:) is strictly concave in jz(A)j if
Q 2 (0; jz(A)j q) and constant if Q > jz(A)j q. Property 1 follows from the
concavity pro…le of V(:) in jz(A)j.
Proof of Lemma 1:
Step 1. Integration increases V(A) for those subsets of A where i is
present but not j; i.e. A µ A : fi 2 A and j = 2 Ag. When A includes i, this
coalition controls in Z0 those outlets that belonged to j in Z. So:
8A µ A : fi 2 A and j = 2 Ag V(A; Z0) ¡V(A;Z) =
V(A [ j;Z) ¡V(A;Z) =4jV(A; Z)
However, for those coalitions A where j is present but not i, i.e. A µ A :
fj 2 A and i = 2 Ag; in Z0 their characteristic valueis only V(Anj;Z). Thus:
8A µ A : fj 2 A and i = 2 Ag V(A; Z0) ¡V(A;Z) =
V(Anj; Z) ¡V(A; Z) =¡4j V(A;Z)
Finally, in thosecases wherefi;jg µ A; and in those caseswhere fi;jg\
A =;, V(A) remainsunchanged. Wecanwritedownthee¤ect ofintegration








fj2A and i= 2Ag
!A4jV(A; Z)
Step 2. For all A0 µ A with fi 2 A and j = 2 Ag, there exists A µ A with
fj 2 A0 and i = 2 Ag, such that A0ni = Anj: So we can write:
X
Aj02A
fi2A and j= 2Ag
!A 4j V(A;Z) =
X
Aj02A
fj2A and i= 2Ag
V(Ani [ j; Z)) ¡V(Aninj; Z)
Therefore we have:
Sh0(A; Z0) ¡Sh0(A;Z) =
X
Aj02A




fi= 2A and j2Ag
!A ¢ ¢2
ijV(A; Z)
Proof of Proposition 1:
Divide both sides of Lemma 1 by V(A) and apply Property 1 to each
single element in the sum.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Step 1:
In order to follow the above intuition we start by taking the marginal
contribution of each subset of retailers A to the industry 4A(A), and nor-





















From (5) and (6), if thenormalized marginal contribution of each subset




















The expression in brackets is equal to zero for Q ¸ kq ,and in the case
of a retail monopolist. It is strictly negative (and thus @
@Q(
4A(A)
V(A) ) > 0) in
case a) and b). We will study them in turn below. First note that the term





































Step 3:Since jz(AnA)j < jz(A)j for all A ½ A, the term in brackets is
negative if the elasticity of R(q) is strictly decreasing in q. This proofs b).
Whiteout this additional assumption on R(q) we get a more limited
result. "R(q)j is continuous in q and:
"R(q)j >08q 2 (0; q) and lim
q!q
"R(q)j = 0
For ”su¢ciently high” q, "R(q)j is strictly decreasing in q. So for ”suf-
…ciently high” Q, for all A ½ A, @
@Q(
4A(A)
V(A) ) > 0. This proofs the case
a).
Proof of Proposition 3:
Step 1. By lemma 1, we can write the di¤erence in the rate at which

























24Step 2. Since ¢2
ijV(A;Z) ·0 for all Q2 (0;kq) (with strict inequality














































For kq > Q ¸ min fjz(Ani [ j)j; jz(Anj [ i)jgq the previous expression is
always non-negative (and strictly positive for A =A). So we get:







Step 3. From proposition 2 we know that at least for su¢ciently high
Q @
@Q®(Q; Z) <0. Together with condition 1 we get that there is a critical

















¯ Q 2 (b q;kq).
Proof of Proposition 4:
Step 1: From lemma 1, thedi¤erence in marginal returns to investment























































Step 2: For kq > Q ¸ min fjz(Ani [ j)j; jz(Anj [ i)jgq the previous
expression is always non-negative (and strictly positive for A = A). So all
the elements of the sum in (8) are positive for
Q 2 [maxfmin fjz(Ani [ j)j ;jz(Anj [ i)jgg;kq]
25So for Q 2 [k ¡maxfjz(i)j; jz(j)jgq; kq) we have:
X
Aj02A






Proof of Proposition 5:




@Q if Sh0(Q¤; Z) ¸
F(Q¤). Is zero otherwise.




² bothQ¤(Z) and Q¤(Z0) arehigherthan e Q, i.e. @
@QF( e Q) · @
@QSh0(e Q;Z0) =
@
@QSh0( e Q; Z):
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